The influence of ethnic diversity on social network structure in a common-pool resource system: implications for collaborative management by Barnes-Mauthe, Michele et al.
Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Barnes-Mauthe, M., S. Arita, S. D. Allen, S. A. Gray, and P. S. Leung. 2013. The influence of ethnic
diversity on social network structure in a common-pool resource system: implications for collaborative
management. Ecology and Society 18(1): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05295-180123
Research
The Influence of Ethnic Diversity on Social Network Structure in a
Common-Pool Resource System: Implications for Collaborative
Management
Michele Barnes-Mauthe 1, Shawn Arita 1,2, Stewart D. Allen 3, Steven A. Gray 1 and PingSun Leung 1
ABSTRACT. Social networks have recently been identified as key features in facilitating or constraining collaborative
arrangements that can enhance resource governance and adaptability in complex social-ecological systems. Nonetheless, the
effect of ethnicity on social network structure in an ethnically diverse common-pool resource system is virtually unknown. We
characterize the entire social network of Hawaii’s longline fishery, an ethnically diverse competitive pelagic fishery, and
investigate network homophily, network structure, and cross-scale linkages. Results show that ethnicity significantly influences
social network structure and is responsible for a homophily effect, which can create challenges for stakeholder collaboration
across groups. Our analysis also suggests that ethnicity influences the formation of diverse network structures, and can affect
the level of linkages to outside industry leaders, government or management officials, and members of the scientific community.
This study provides the first empirical examination of the impact of ethnic diversity on resource user’s social networks in the
common-pool resource literature, having important implications for collaborative resource management.
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INTRODUCTION
Social networks have recently been identified as important
characteristics of social-ecological systems that can facilitate
or constrain collaboration and other key aspects of effective
natural resource governance (Bodin and Prell 2011). Social
networks, defined as patterns of relationships between
individuals or groups, can facilitate information exchange
between actors with diverse perspectives and enhance
stakeholder cooperation (Crona and Bodin 2006, Isaac et al.
2007). Social networks can also provide stakeholders access
to external resources and aid in mobilizing those resources
necessary for effective management (Carlsson and Sandström
2008, Newman and Dale 2007). Additionally, social networks
have been found to facilitate the establishment of common
rules, norms, and sanctions among stakeholders (Dietz et al.
2003, Pretty 2003), and enhance conflict resolution (Hahn et
al. 2006, Bodin and Crona 2009). 
Despite the positive influence social networks can have on
natural resource governance initiatives, not all networks
function in the same manner (Bodin and Crona 2009). Social
networks can be comprised of various structural patterns with
different types of network ties, each with advantages and
potential drawbacks depending on the context. For example,
empirical studies have shown that social networks with low
structural cohesion, particularly those with the existence of
various subgroups, can pose challenges to collaboration
because of “us-them” attitudes that may develop (Krackhardt
and Stern 1988, Borgatti and Foster 2003). In contrast,
cohesive networks with a high density of ties have been found
to be positively correlated with joint action (Crona and Bodin
2009). However, densely connected networks have also been
shown to result in the homogenization of knowledge and
experiences (Gray et al. 2012a), which may negatively impact
resource governance if attitudes and practices not conducive
to managing resources sustainably are compounded
throughout the network (Oh et al. 2004, Bodin and Norberg
2005). Thus, understanding the structural pattern of social
networks in natural resource systems is important for gaining
a more thorough understanding of how social processes may
impede or facilitate effective collaborative management and
sustainable resource use (Bodin and Prell 2011).  
In common-pool resource systems, the structure of resource
user’s social networks may be particularly important to
consider because of the high levels of uncertainty and
competition over resource use often inherent in them (Grafton
2005). This can become even more complex when resource
users are comprised of ethnically diverse backgrounds with
different language capabilities and cultural norms that
influence decision making and behaviors. Previous
sociological research on social networks has shown that racial
and ethnic differences can create strong divides between
individuals, which can have substantial implications on the
level and quality of information different actors receive, the
attitudes and beliefs they form, and the interactions they
experience (McPherson et al. 2001). Thus, ethnic diversity
among resource users is likely to influence social network
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structure, which can affect collaboration and patterns of
resource use, yet the role of ethnic diversity on social networks
in a common-pool resource system has yet to be examined.  
The goal of this study is to contribute to the relatively new
field of social networks and natural resource management by
analyzing resource user’s social networks in an ethnically
diverse common-pool resource system. We begin by
reviewing recent literature relating to social networks and
natural resource management and reconcile this perspective
with theory related to ethnic diversity, public goods, and
socioeconomic outcomes.
Bonding, bridging, and cross-scale linkages
Network structure can be affected by three different types of
social ties: (1) bonding ties, which involve strong social
linkages within groups of like-minded individuals
characterized by dense, localized networks; (2) bridging ties,
which characterize weaker linkages across somewhat similar,
but different groups or social networks; and (3) cross-scale
linkages, or linking ties, which refer to ties across incongruent
groups or networks at different hierarchical levels (Grafton
2005). Strong ties are particularly relevant in common-pool
resource systems because common-pool resources can be
augmented or depleted by the level of harvesting, harvesting
is often rivalrous, and the ability to exclude outsiders is
typically limited (Grafton 2005). Therefore trust, cooperation,
and reciprocity, often enriched by strong bonding networks,
can be vital in encouraging individuals to observe standards,
rules, and sustainable practices, thus decreasing externalities
for individual resource users (Grafton 2005, Gray et al. 2012b).
 
In contrast, bridging ties have the ability to link heterogeneous
groups or networks of people into a larger network, which can
facilitate access to external resources and diverse knowledge
(Crona 2006, Newman and Dale 2007, Sandström and Rova
2010). Key actors forming bridging ties among smaller groups
or subgroups may also help to foster trust among
heterogeneous actors and may be capable of connecting and
mobilizing subgroups toward a common goal, which can
advance collaborative processes (Woolcock 2001, Bodin and
Crona 2009, Ramirez-Sanchez 2011a).  
Cross-scale linkages can be beneficial because they can (1)
provide stakeholders increased access to scientific knowledge;
(2) facilitate the transfer of local ecological knowledge from
the bottom up; (3) help ensure stakeholder interests are
represented in the management and policy arena; and (4)
facilitate stakeholder understanding and cooperation in regard
to management initiatives (Woolcock 2001, Grafton 2005). 
Thus, the structure of resource user’s social networks can have
important implications for collaborative resource management.
Nonetheless, there have been relatively few studies on the
factors that influence resource user’s social networks (but see
Crona and Bodin 2006, Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton 2009,
and Ramirez-Sanchez 2011b), and the impact of ethnic
diversity among stakeholders on social network structure in
terms of collaborative resource management is virtually
unknown.
Ethnicity and social structure
Many studies have shown that ethnic diversity among actors
can play a substantial role in influencing social and economic
outcomes. For example, empirical socioeconomic research
has found that ethnic diversity is generally associated with
fragmentation and lower levels of trust across groups (Alesina
and La Ferrara 2002, Ruttan 2006). In relation to public goods,
ethnic diversity is often associated with a decreased ability to
impose social sanctions, which can lead to collaborative
failures (Miguel and Gugerty 2005, Baland et al. 2007).  
In terms of social networks, previous research has shown that
ethnic diversity can create ethnic boundaries (Baerveldt et al.
2004) and enclaves (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993), and
ethnicity has been identified as the number one cause of
homophily, wherein individuals tend to associate with others
similar to themselves (McPherson et al. 2001). Indeed,
numerous studies looking at social structure have found
evidence of strong preference for intra-ethnic-group relations
(Schofield 1979, 1991, DuBois and Hirsch 1990, Clark and
Ayers 1992, Currarini et al. 2009). This ethnic homophily
effect is thought to be inflated under conditions of competition
(Poteete and Ostrom 2004), which is a typical characteristic
of common-pool resource systems (Costello et al. 2008).
Indeed, a recent study by Pomeroy et al. (2007) found
ethnicity, among other effects, to be a significant determinant
of conflict over fisheries resources in Thailand. Though in
some cases ethnic diversity among stakeholders has been
found to have a negligible impact on cooperation across groups
(Varughese and Ostrom 2001), the specific conditions under
which this occurs is still poorly understood. 
Given the influence of ethnicity on social relationships
coupled with the importance of social networks for
collaboration in natural resource management, in this paper
we explore the relationship between ethnic diversity and social
network structure in a competitive common-pool resource
system. Specifically, we use common metrics from social
network analysis (SNA) and examine network homophily,
network structure, and cross-scale linkages to infer
characteristics of representation, cooperation, and communication
in an ethnically diverse competitive pelagic fishery.
Study area
Hawaii’s longline fishery (HLF) is the dominant commercial
fishery sector in the Hawaiian Islands harvesting mainly
bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus), yellowfin tuna (Thunnus
albacares), and swordfish (Xiphias gladius; Fig. 1). In 2011
there were 129 active vessels that completed 1388 fishing trips
(NOAA 2012) generating approximately $76 million in
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revenue (WPacFIN 2012). Though Hawaii has a historically
diverse multicultural background (see Nordyke 1989, Haas
1998), the HLF is dominated by three distinct ethnic groups:
Korean-American fishers (K-A), Vietnamese-American (V-
A) fishers, and Euro-American (E-A) fishers (Allen et al.
2013). Though Asian-Americans make up the majority of the
population in Hawaii, we classify V-A and K-A fishers
separately because the majority of them are first generation
immigrants and speak limited English, the dominant language
of Hawaii. This classification is in line with previous research
(Allen and Gough 2006, 2007, Allen et al. 2013) and was
corroborated by fishers (see Appendix 1). E-A fishers largely
consist of individuals from the mainland U.S. (Allen et al.
2013) whose native language is English, and are therefore
considered the locally dominant ethnic group because they
make up 25% of Hawaii’s population, compared with only
1.7% Korean and 0.5% Vietnamese according to the 2011 U.
S. Census estimates (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).
Fig. 1. Map of the study area identifying the range of
Hawaii’s longline fleet. Longline fishers are restricted from
fishing within 50-75 nm of Hawaii’s coastline, and typically
fish both within and outside of the United States’ Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) bordering the Hawaiian Islands.
The HLF is under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Magnuson-
Stevens Act (NOAA 2006) and is governed by institutional
top-down management that includes participation input by
fishers (details here: http://www.wpcouncil.org/pelagic/
Pelagics%20FMP.html). As a limited entry fishery regulated
by a total allowable catch (TAC) on bigeye tuna, a sea turtle
bycatch cap, area closures, gear restrictions, onboard
observers (100% coverage for shallow set swordfish lines,
20% coverage for deep set tuna lines), mandatory logbook and
vessel monitoring systems, and numerous other restrictions,
the HLF is considered well regulated. However, management
still suffers shortcomings; enforcement is costly and not
always effective (Allen and Gough 2007, Wilson 2009). Also,
there are still some concerns over bycatch of some species
(Davies 2012, Kubota 2012), and HLF fishers face growing
social and economic impacts from increased competition and
regulation (Pan et al. 2001, Allen and Gough 2006, 2007, Allen
et al. 2013). Moreover, although U.S. fisheries management
is largely built around participation, there are criticisms
(McCay and Jentoft 1996) and it has been argued that
management of the HLF lacks adequate collaboration and
representation among stakeholders given their cultural and
geographic isolation (Allen and Gough 2007). Therefore,
understanding the degree of collaboration and representation
among fishers by way of SNA may provide insight into the
level of cooperation among users, which has previously been
associated with more sustainable, equitable, and efficient
management outcomes (Ostrom 1990, Dietz et al. 2003, Rova
2004, Pinto De Silva and Kitts 2006, Marín and Berkes 2010).
METHODS
The primary methodology employed in this study was SNA,
a quantitative method that uses sociograms and graph theory
to analyze social relationships. To obtain the social network
data, we developed a structured survey (see Appendix 1) in
which primary decision makers were asked to nominate at
least 5, but up to 10 individuals in the HLF with whom they
shared useful information regarding different aspects of
fishing that they felt was valuable for their fishing success.
We defined primary decision makers as vessel owners and
captains and they are collectively referred to as fishers
throughout this paper. The survey was pretested with fishers
in each ethnic group to reduce misinterpretation caused by
cultural differences and to diminish potential bias in data
collection, after which data was collected for a total of nine
months beginning in May 2011. While administering surveys,
fishers often spoke openly and at length about different aspects
of collaboration and fishery management, which was recorded
as notes by field researchers. Acknowledging that this data
was collected in an informal and unstructured manner, we
incorporate some fisher’s qualitative comments into our
discussion to add insight to our results. 
Basic network characteristics, such as number of actors, total
and mean number of ties, indegree (# of ties identified going
to each actor), and outdegree (# of ties going from each actor),
were analyzed for the entire HLF network and for each ethnic
community of fishers.
Network homophily
To examine network homophily we employ three basic
network measures: component analysis, ANOVA density
model of variable homophily, and relational contingency table
analysis.
Component analysis
This analysis identifies the number of networks in the dataset
that are not connected to each other (Hanneman and Riddle
2005). If a network contains completely separate components,
it would be an example of the most extreme case of homophily
if actors were grouped by a specific attribute, such as ethnicity.
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ANOVA density model of variable homophily
This model tests the likelihood that the density of ties within
each group defined by a particular attribute differs from all
ties that are not within groups (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
Density is a measure of the proportion of ties present in a
network to all possible ties in a network and ranges from 0, if
there are no ties present, to 1, if all possible ties are present
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005). We examine homophily in the
following attributes: ethnicity, title, age, education, and
experience.
Relational contingency table (RCT) analysis
RCT analysis determines the ratio of measured versus
expected ties within and between groups, where the expected
number of ties equals the number of ties expected by chance
alone in a network of equal size and number of ties under a
model of independence (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). We use
RCT analysis to test the observed/expected tie ratios both
within and between ethnic groups.
Network structure
Building on work from Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton
(2009), we adopt Crowe’s (2007) framework for
conceptualizing community networks by examining k-cores
and cutpoints to categorize each network as complete,
coalitional, or bridging (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Example of a complete, coalitional, and bridging
network classified by Crowe’s (2007) framework for
analyzing community network structures, adapted from
Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton (2009).
K-core analysis
Employed to determine the level of cohesion in a community
network, k-core analysis identifies parts of the network that
form subgroups in a way that each member of the subgroup is
connected to at least k number of other actors in the subgroup.
The value of k for each group is determined by finding the
maximum amount of actors whom each actor accesses for
information, and the lowest reported value of k is used to
facilitate comparisons across groups (Crowe 2007).
Blocks and cutpoints
Used as an indicator of bridging, cutpoints are an actor in a
network whom, if removed, would fragment the network into
two or more subnetworks, termed blocks. We examine the
proportion of cutpoints to total points in each network as an
indicator of structural holes, or weakness in the network
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
Cross-scale linkages
To examine the level of cross-scale linkages to outside industry
leaders, government or management officials, and members
of the scientific community for each ethnic community of
fishers, we again investigate values calculated by the RCT
analysis. Though some actors within each fishing community
also classify as industry leaders, for example, a vessel owner
who also runs a supply store, we highlight linking ties to actors
outside of the three identified fishing communities to whom
all HLF fishers potentially have equal access. 
All data was analyzed in UCINET6’s suite of social network
programs (Borgatti et al. 2002), and SPSS Version 20.
Network data was visualized in NetDraw (Borgatti 2002).
RESULTS
Our response rate was 91.2% for the entire fishery (145 of 159
fishers); 93.3% for V-A fishers (70 of 75); 89.7% for E-A
fishers (52 of 58); and 88.5% for K-A fishers (23 of 26).
Though there were a total of 14 fishers who did not participate
in the survey, nine of them were identified by at least one but
typically a handful of other fishers, making it possible to infer
their network, whereas the other five were not identified. Thus,
we treated our data as the population, classifying the five actors
not identified as isolated fishers. The entire HLF network
includes all ties (either valuable or very valuable; see
Appendix 1) and actors identified by respondents (Fig. 3).
Fisher’s ethnic community networks can be found in Figs. 4
(E-A network), 5 (K-A network), and 6 (V-A network). 
Basic network characteristics are presented in Table 1. In the
entire HLF network, fishers had an average of 9.28 ties per
actor, where all ties reported by respondents were considered.
E-A fishers and K-A fishers averaged 6.19 and 6.09 ties per
actor, respectively. V-A fishers had a significantly higher
average at 12.74 ties per actor. As shown in Fig. 7, indegree
and outdegree followed a similar pattern, in which both the E-
A and K-A means were not statistically different. V-A fishers,
on the other hand, had significantly higher means for both
indegree and outdegree.
Network homophily
Results of the component analysis (Table 1) showed that all
networks formed a single component, meaning no subgroup
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Table 1. Summary of group level network characteristics.
 
Entire HLF E-A K-A V-A
Network data
Total actors 179 60 25 77
Total no. of ties 895 189 73 542
Mean ties per actor 9.28 6.19† 6.04† 12.74
No. of components 1 1 1 1
Isolated actors 5 1 0 0
Indicators of network cohesion
Largest k-core 8 4 4 8
No. of actors in largest k-core 48 34 16 48
Proportion in 4-core and higher 0.75 0.58 0.64 0.99
Indicators of structural holes
No. of cutpoints 10 7 0 1
No. of blocks 20 11 1 2
Proportion of cutpoints to total points 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.01
Estimated network configuration Coalitional Bridging Complete/ Bonding Complete/ Bonding
†
 Describes homogenous subsets using the least significant difference (LSD) & Tukey test at a >1% level of significance.
Fig. 3. Network configuration of all relations identified by
Hawaii’s longline fishers, referred to as the entire HLF
network. Nodes (representing actors) with the smallest path
lengths to each other are placed closest together in the graph
by an algorithm that uses iterative fitting. E-A = Euro-
American, V-A = Vietnamese-American, K-A = Korean-
American.
of fishers was completely isolated from the rest. In the entire
HLF network there were five isolated fishers, whereas in the
E-A community there was one; however, isolated actors were
not considered in the group analyses, which is consistent with
previous research (Crowe 2007).  
Results of the ANOVA density model of variable homophily
for each of the selected attributes are presented in Table 2. A
dataset containing respondent’s only (91.2% of the total
population) was used to ensure there was no missing attribute
data. Densities within groups were converted to a percentage
for ease of display.  
Table 2. Density of ties by individual attribute (ethnicity,
education, experience, age, and title) for all respondents.
Densities marked with an * indicate significance at the 5%
level according to the ANOVA test of variable homophily
model.
 
Category (n) Density
Ethnicity
E-A (47) 8*
K-A (22) 13*
V-A (70) 10*
Education
Elementary School or less (50) 9*
High School (48) 4
Some College (25) 5
Bachelor's Degree or Higher (16) 6
Experience Indicator †
1-25 (11) 5
26-50 (31) 4
51-75 (70) 7*
76-100 (20) 7*
100+ (7) 2
Age
25-34 (8) 4
35-44 (21) 4
45-54 (49) 7*
55-64 (48) 4
65+ (13) 5
Title
Owner (24) 5
Captain (66) 4
Owner/Operator (34) 5
Own/Ind. Leader (15) 12*
†Experience Indicator is equal to the sum of experience fishing (in years),
years living in Hawaii, and years in the HLF.
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Fig. 4. Network configuration of ties within the Euro-
American (E-A) community. Nodes (representing actors)
with the smallest path lengths to each other are placed
closest together by an algorithm that uses iterative fitting.
Fig. 5. Network configuration of ties within the Korean-
American (K-A) community. Nodes (representing actors)
with the smallest path lengths to each other are placed
closest together by an algorithm that uses iterative fitting.
Ethnicity appeared to be the strongest factor influencing
fisher’s networks, with all of the within group densities for
ethnicity being significant. According to the ANOVA model,
results also suggested homophilic tendencies within groups
for fishers in the elementary school or less category, the 51-75
and 75-100 experience indicator categories, the 45-54 age
group, and the owner/industry leader title category. However,
none of these attributes displayed significant homophily in all
categories besides ethnicity.  
Table 3 shows the RCT analysis results for the entire HLF
network as the observed/expected ratios for both within and
between group ties by ethnicity. Along with a much higher
ratio of observed/expected ties within ethnic groups, there
were significantly fewer ties between ethnic communities than
would be expected under a model of independence. Strikingly,
there were no ties to the K-A community originating from the
V-A community, while the observed/expected ratio from K-
A fishers to V-A fishers was only 0.11.
Fig. 6. Network configuration of ties within the
Vietnamese-American (V-A) community. Nodes
(representing actors) with the smallest path lengths to each
other are placed closest together by an algorithm that uses
iterative fitting.
Fig. 7. Normalized outdegree and indegree boxplots for
each ethnic community of fishers. E-A = Euro-American,
K-A = Korean-American, V-A = Vietnamese-American.
Network structure
Results of the k-core and cutpoint analyses as well as the
estimated network configuration for each community can be
found in Table 1. The entire HLF network was classified as a
coalitional structure because of the observed division along
ethnic lines (Fig. 3) as well as the moderate rate of cutpoints
(0.06). Though the entire HLF network had a high order of k-
core (k = 8), which was an indicator of network cohesion, all
of the 48 fishers in this order were from the V-A community
(see the V-A community k-core results). 
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Table 3. Relational contingency table (RCT) analysis results by ethnicity on all identified Hawaii’s longline fishery (HLF) ties.
Values are reported as the proportion of observed vs. expected number of ties within and between groups, where a value of 1.00
represents the expected number of ties. Values in bold indicate a higher proportion of ties than would be expected in a network
of the same size and number of ties under a model of independence.
 
E-A K-A V-A
Ind. Leaders/Govt. & Mgmt. Officials/Scientific Community
E-A 1.91 0.37 0.13 0.35
K-A 0.07 4.00 0.11 0.08
V-A 0.09 0.00 3.25 0.98
The E-A community was classified as a bridging structure
(Fig.4), whereas the K-A community (Fig. 5) and the V-A
community (Fig. 6) were classified as complete/bonding
structures. The difference between the bonding and bridging
classification was most obvious when comparing the E-A and
V-A networks. The E-A community (Fig. 4) had only 58% of
its members in the 4-core and higher order, whereas the V-A
community (Fig. 6) had 99%. Furthermore, the E-A
community had 7 cutpoints and 11 blocks; if these 7 actors
were removed from the E-A community, the E-A network
would be fragmented into 11 subnetworks. The V-A
community only had 1 cutpoint and 2 blocks. Comparatively,
the K-A community (Fig. 5) had no identifiable cutpoints,
which was a major factor in its classification.
Cross-scale linkages
The results concerning cross-scale linkages can be found in
the final column of Table 3 as the ratio of observed vs. expected
number of ties between each ethnic community of fishers and
industry leaders, government or management officials, and
members of the scientific community. K-A fishers reported
8% of ties of this nature that one would expect under a model
of independence, whereas E-A fishers reported 35%, and V-
A fishers reported 98%.
DISCUSSION
Our network analysis revealed that no group of fishers was
completely fragmented or isolated from any other group;
however, a homophily effect was clearly apparent, with
ethnicity being the most significant factor over all other
attributes. We found that E-A fishers appeared to have a
bridging network structure; K-A and V-A fishers a bonding
network structure; while the entire HLF network appeared
more bridging/coalitional. V-A fishers reported most ties per
capita as well as the highest level of cross-scale linkages to
industry leaders, government or management officials, and
members of the scientific community. E-A fishers reported a
lower level of cross scale linkages than expected, while K-A
fishers reported only one tie to an outside industry leader.
Ethnic homophily and bridging ties
Analogous to our findings (Tables 2, 3), ethnic homophily has
been identified by many previous social and economic studies
(e.g., Schofield 1979, 1991, DuBois and Hirsch 1990, Clark
and Ayers 1992, Currarini et al. 2009). This preference for
within group relations may be explained by the social identity
theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), in which individuals have a
sense of group belonging with respect to cultural norms,
values, and traditions.  
In a resource governance context, this division of actors can
present challenges, particularly for stakeholder collaboration
across groups. Homophily in networks can affect the
information different actors receive and the attitudes and
beliefs they form (McPherson et al. 2001), which in turn can
influence their decisions and actions regarding resource use
and extraction, rule compliance, adherence to norms, and
cooperation (Ostrom et al. 1994). Moreover, group identities
can cause individuals to accentuate their differences with
others rather than their similarities, which can augment
conflict (Baerveldt et al. 2004). Indeed, previous research on
the HLF found that the three ethnic communities of fishers
demonstrate different fishing practices, exhibit different
attitudes toward fishery management and regulations, and lack
trusting relationships across groups (Allen et al. 2013).
Further, while collecting data it was not uncommon for fishers
to speak openly about fishers from different ethnic
backgrounds as being part of a separate group of actors
altogether, signifying the existence of an “us-them” attitude
(Krackhardt and Stern 1988, Borgatti and Foster 2003). This
lack of cohesion and trust across groups may substantially
reduce the ability of HLF fishers to mobilize and agree on and
enforce social norms, which are key aspects of collaborative
resource governance. 
Despite this division, our results showed that ties bridging
ethnic communities in the HLF do exist (Fig. 3). These ties
may help to build trust across ethnic divides and bring
subgroups together behind a common goal under the right
circumstances (Bodin and Crona 2009). However, actors
occupying central positions between subgroups may also
impede collaboration because they may be unaware of their
position between subgroups or uninterested in fostering joint
action (Bodin and Crona 2009). Thus, identifying these actors
and bringing them into the decision making process is likely
to benefit the long-term sustainability and adaptability of the
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resource system, which can be classified as a ‘network
intervention’ (Valente 2012). These central actors may be able
to influence understanding and cooperation among diverse
resource users in regard to governance initiatives, while also
aiding in the dissemination of technological and scientific
information. This type of collaboration would also help to
ensure that resource user’s interests are represented in the
management arena, which may further influence cooperation
and participation in resource planning and management (Prell
et al. 2008).  
Though our analysis focused primarily on ethnic network
homophily, it is important to note that our results also revealed
homophilic tendencies within the owner/industry leader
category (Table 2). This may also have important implications
for management because vessel owners/industry leaders are
likely to be key players and important sources of information
for other resource users. Though characterizing key actors in
the network is outside the scope of the current study, future
research could seek to examine the agency, power, and
influence of central actors and their potential for facilitating
or hindering joint action and collaboration across ethnic
groups, which would build on other similar inquiries (e.g.,
Crona and Bodin 2006, Prell et al. 2011, Ramirez-Sanchez
2011a, García-Amado et al. 2012). Although our analysis
looked at ethnicity and other attributes separately, future
research could also seek to employ social network modeling
methods that may examine these and other effects jointly (see
Snijders et al. 2006).
Ethnic group structure and social capital
Both K-A and V-A fishers appeared to have a bonding group
network structure, though results showed that the V-A
community was more cohesive (Table 1, Fig. 6). This is
consistent with a previous study done on social proximity by
Romani (2003), which found that ethnic minority groups are
more likely to exchange high levels of information within their
communities.  
Derived from the theory of embeddedness (Granovetter 1985),
cohesive bonding networks are sometimes referred to as a type
of social capital lubricated by bounded solidarity, reciprocal
interactions, and trust, in which norms, rules, and sanctions
are likely to be established (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993,
Pretty 2003). The circumstance of “foreignness” is argued to
be a key source of this type of social capital among immigrants
(Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Indeed, previous
ethnographic research on the HLF has found that V-A fishers
typically demonstrate strong kinship and solidarity within
their community, with many immediate and extended family
members owning and/or working on a number of vessels
together, and assisting others when needed (Allen and Gough
2006, Allen et al. 2013). Coupled with our results here, it
appears that a high level of social capital exists within the V-
A community. However, previous research also suggests that
this community cohesion may be weakened by outside
impacts; V-A fishers reported a feeling of fragmentation
within their community after the temporary swordfish fishery
closure in 2001, which had tremendous social and economic
impacts on the community (Allen and Gough 2006).  
Though less cohesive than the V-A network, results showed
that K-A fishers also form a single, bonding network (Table
1, Fig. 5). Though this result suggests that the K-A community
may function in a manner similar to the V-A community,
previous research on the HLF found a strong divide among K-
A fishers and a general feeling of low solidarity (Allen et al.
2013). One potential explanation for the incongruity in our
findings compared with previous research is that many K-A
fishers recently exited the fishery (observed while collecting
data), which may have caused a social reorganization. In
contrast, our results suggest that the E-A community reflects
a bridging network structure that is less tightly bound together
(Table 1, Fig. 4), which was hypothesized by previous research
(Allen et al. 2013).
Cross-scale linkages: connecting a broader world
V-A fishers reported a significantly higher proportion of cross-
scale linkages than both other groups in our analysis (Table
3). This result differs from previous work that found that ethnic
minority groups tend to have less access to extension services
than the locally dominant ethnic group (i.e., Romani 2003).
Though here we focused primarily on ethnic dominance
relating to proportion of the local population and language
capabilities, ethnic dominance can also be influenced by
various social and political processes (Waring 2011). Thus,
our results regarding cross-scale linkages are particularly
intriguing in this case because members of the E-A community
rather than the V-A community occupy the majority of
leadership positions in the Hawaii Longline Association
(HLA), which represents HLF fishers in the governance arena.
Although some members of the E-A community reported
having ties to HLA officials as well as supply store owners,
gear and technology experts, fish auction officials, and
government or management officials, many of these ties were
identified by only a single E-A fisher. Additionally, the
majority of linking ties in the E-A community were identified
by only two fishers who themselves also classify as industry
leaders (Fig. 3). In contrast, several vessel owners, captains,
as well as vessel owners/industry leaders in the V-A
community reported similar ties to the same type of actors
listed above, but also identified ties to members of the coast
guard, customs/border protection officials, and crew agents,
and in many cases, ties to these actors were identified by more
than one V-A fisher. One possible explanation for this is that
V-A fishers have more ties per capita than E-A and K-A fishers
(Fig. 7). Another potential explanation is that although the
Vietnamese represent an ethnic minority in Hawaii, V-A
fishers currently make up the majority in the HLF. A critical
question may be whether ethnic dominance at the local level
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or at the system level more distinctly influences the
development of, or access to cross-scale linkages (Waring
2011).  
K-A fishers reported solely one tie to an industry leader outside
of their ethnic community (Fig. 3), which suggests that K-A
fishers may be somewhat marginalized from key actors
involved in decision making and that their interests may not
be adequately represented in the management and policy
arena. Also, the lack of cross-scale linkages suggests K-A
fishers may have trouble accessing technological and
scientific information and resources (Grafton 2005).
CONCLUSION
Effective management requires an understanding of not only
the biological and ecological characteristics of complex
social-ecological systems, but also the social aspects of the
system. Previous literature has not adequately assessed the
role of ethnic diversity on social networks in common-pool
resource systems. This study quantitatively shows that ethnic
diversity can have a significant impact on network structure
and cross-scale linkages, which is likely affecting the potential
for collaboration and the overall adaptability of the system.  
Though our study was conducted on a single common-pool
resource system, we believe that our results are generalizable
to other natural resource settings. Our analysis suggests that
ethnicity may be responsible for the formation of diverse
network structures among resource users. The bonding nature
of ethnic minority groups found here suggests that they may
depend more on information sharing within their groups,
which may help to decrease externalities by building trust and
encouraging reciprocity within their community (Grafton
2005, Prell 2009). Cohesive bonding networks and social
capital within communities can also lead to successful
resource management by helping to establish social norms
(Gutiérrez et al. 2011); however, normative attitudes in
bonding communities, which may not be conducive to
managing resources sustainably, may also be difficult to
change (Ehrlich and Levin 2005). Moreover, having a high
level of bonding ties may also be responsible for the
homogenization of knowledge and experiences, which can
negatively impact the ability to adapt to environmental change
(Bodin and Crona 2009).  
The flow of important scientific information such as
knowledge on the state of the resource or technological
innovation concerning new sustainable extraction strategies
can also be highly impacted by diverse network structures.
Therefore managers may need to consider more adequately
the role of ethnic diversity among resource user’s social
networks when considering new management options or
attempting to disseminate information because reaching
different ethnic communities may require alternative
strategies. Because our results show that ethnicity may also
play a role in the level of cross-scale linkages to which resource
users have access, it may be advantageous for actors in
decision making positions to take steps to ensure that ties exist
between all resource user groups and the decision making
body. This can enhance participation while helping to ensure
resource users are represented in the management arena and
provided access to resources and scientific knowledge.
Reaching this level of engagement may also help to increase
the rate of adoption of sustainable practices and facilitate
understanding and cooperation among resource users in regard
to management and policy initiatives, generally having a
positive effect on long-term sustainability. 
We live in an increasingly globalized world where ethnic
diversity among stakeholders is not limited to this case. As
this study found, ethnic barriers may be substantial obstacles
to collaboration. Further research could seek to identify the
instances that overcome these barriers and explore how such
bridging across ethnically or culturally diverse social groups
could be enhanced.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5295
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Appendix 1. Data Collection and Survey Questions 
 
 
Though we developed a survey-questionnaire that could have been filled out by respondents if 
they chose, the majority of our data was collected via face-to-face interviews in the primary 
language of each fisher. Respondents were first asked to participate, and then asked a few 
general warm up questions regarding their position in the fishery and their experience fishing. 
Respondents were then asked to nominate at least five, but up to ten people with whom they 
share useful information regarding different aspects of fishing within the HLF that they felt was 
valuable for their fishing success. Respondents were prompted to consider relationships that they 
might have with vessel owners, captains, supply store owners or other industry leaders, 
government/management officials, and members of the scientific community. Respondents were 
also asked to consider relationships they might have with fishers or other actors from different 
ethnic backgrounds. General sociodemographics and ethnic association were also collected. 
100% of K-A and V-A fishers self-identified as either Korean or Vietnamese (respectively). The 
majority of E-A fishers self-identified as ‘Caucasian’ or ‘American’ when asked their ethnicity, 
while some E-A fishers reported European ancestry. A limited number of questionnaires were 
sent and returned via mail and email to owners currently living on the mainland U.S., outside of 
the study area. When this was the case, a cover letter was attached describing the study and study 
aim. Our survey used the following format to gain insight into the nature of each relationship 
identified, and left ten open spaces for respondents to identify individuals in their network: 
 
 
 
I.   (name of individual)   professional acquaintance friend family member 
strength of relationship (circle one): 
very strong strong weak very weak 
 
A. How did you meet this person? 
 family member  through fishing  from a friend 
 from a family member  other:   
 
B. How often do you share useful information about aspects of fishing with this person? 
 Not often (1-3 times/yr.)  Sometimes (1-3 times/mo.)  A lot (1-3 times/wk. or more) 
 
C. What do you typically talk to this person about? (check all that apply) 
 
 
 
 
 
D. In general, how valuable would you say the information that you share with this person is to 
your fishing success? 
 Very valuable  Somewhat valuable  Not valuable 
